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Abstract.  The demands for an efficient and reliable man-machine inter-
face in industrial process plant are increasing due to the steadily growing
size and complexity of installations.  At the same time, computerized tech-
nology offers the possibility of powerful and effective solutions to designers.
In the paper, problems related to interface design, operator training and
human reliability are discussed in the light of this technological develop-
ment, and an integrated approach to system design based on a consistent
model or framework describing the man-machine interaction is advocated.
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by the Board of Nordic Ministers, for the study of control room design and
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INTRODUCTION
The general trend in the technological development of industrial process
installations has been towards larger and more complex plants.  Very often
large plants imply large concentrations of energy or hazardous material, and
maloperation can have serious consequences not only for the plant itself and
its operating staff, but also for the environment and general public.  This
situation has forced system designers and safety authorities to take into ac-
count the ability of the system to control and counteract potentially risky
states of maloperation of very low probability of occurrence.
Since it is impossible to take all possible hazardous combinations of indi-
vidually low-risk situations into account during system design, the operating
staff is generally supposed to cope with such complex, unforeseen situa-
tions.  In spite of the introduction of complex automatic safety systems in-
dustrial accidents do occur.  The conclusions of the analyses after the fact
typically find important contributions from "operator error", and they point
to the need for more effective training while expressing wonder about why
the operators did not infer from the indications that a dangerous situation
was under way.  As it has been discussed elsewhere (Rasmussen 1979), this
is not fair to operators, and the technological development, particularly of
information processing equipment, raise a number of questions which are
important to consider during systems' design.
THE NEED FOR A THEORY
The basic issue is related to the fact that we are now in a period when
digital computers are being considered for improvement of the control of in-
dustrial systems and for the support of the operating staff in many different
ways.  The inexpensive and reliable process computer is changing the task
allocation between operators and instrumentation; it brings with it new ways
of processing and presentation of process variables; it makes possible effec-
tive support of operators through disturbance analysis; and it can be used
for high fidelity training simulators.  Generally, these possibilities are con-
sidered separately.  However, they are so intimately related that it is difficult
to envisage them being graduallly and independently introduced.  Introduc-
ing new technology in system design is a kind of multidimensional optimiza-
tion process in a multipeaked landscape in which the different summits rep-
resent choices among different basic design concepts.  An extensive use of
computers in all of the above areas will hopefully create a new tall peak.
Unfortunately, however, this cannot be reached in an optimal way by cau-
tious experiments in one dimension at a time, but only by a jump in all di-
mensions simultaneously.  Furthermore, we can only expect to hit the peak
within a reasonable vicinity of the top if we know where it is from the outset,
i.e., if we have a theory or framework to guide the jump.
A MODEL OF MAN
An important part of such a theory is a performance model of human
plant operators.  As long as industrial man-machine interfaces were based
on the traditional one sensor - one indicator concept and the size of instal-
lations were small enough to allow operators to operate by empirical "tricks
of the trade" acquired through apprenticeship, simple models of human op-
erators, like the information channel model used in the Purdue Guideline
(Purdue 1975) were sufficient, and knob-and-dial ergonomics can be viewed
as a separate discipline.  More complex models - like the one shown in the
above-mentioned guidelines (p. 27) "merely to indicate the extent to which
Human Factors Engineering attempts to study the behaviour of the human
operator" - should be taken seriously during systems' design.
Modern large scale industrial systems are drawing upon the whole range
of human faculties, as illustrated in fig. 1. In an automated process plant of
balanced design, the frequency of events calling for operator attention can be
expected to be somehow inversely related to the risk implied in the situa-
tions.  At the same time, the mode of performance of humans is tightly re-
lated to the frequency of occurrence of a task - varying from subconscious
routines to knowledge-based problem solving. Even if we do not consider the
psychological theories related to the different modes of performance but deal
only with basic information processing aspects of the performance in engi-
neering terms, some important distinctions emerge for systems design.
Fig. 1. The basis of human performance depends on the frequency of call for action, and the
acceptable frequency of an event will depend upon the potential loss implied.
Fig. 2. Schematic illustration of different domains of the control of human performance.
In fig. 2 the distinction is drawn between three different domains of hu-
man performance depending upon the underlying control of the behaviour.
This model has been described elsewhere (Goodstein and Rasmussen, 1980),
in the present context only some important implications for systems design,
definition of human errors and operator training will be discussed.  The
three levels are closely related to the frequency of tasks as indicated on fig.
1. The very frequent daily routines are performed in the domain of skill-
based behaviour, the less frequent, but still familiar tasks are performed in
the rule-based domain, and finally the tasks which have not been met before
and not analysed during design must be performed by knowledge-based be-
haviour.  There are very fundamental differences between the three domains
with respect to several aspects of the design problem.
INFORMATION DISPLAYS
The operator's input information - or rather the information sought or
taken by him - from the system plays very different roles.  In the skill-based
domain, when humans in a way perform as multivariable control systems
manipulating physical objects (- which can be graphical -Cigures) or navi-
gating through the environment, the sensory information acts as signals;
i.e., analogue representations of spatial variables.  When humans are not
operating on physical objects directly but by means of displays and keys on
a control console, the implication will be that in the skill-based domain the
control console itself is operated on instead of the underlying process.  In
the rule-based domairi7 Performance is based on recognition of states of the
system with association to known rules or plans.  When operation is per-
formed directly on physical objects, states are perceived very reliably.  If
however, selected information is available only as individual variables dis-
played on a control console, reliable state identification will demand con-
scious inference on the part of the operator, and this cannot be expected
from operators during all routine situations.  Instead, characteristic indica-
tions of the presented information will act as signs representing system
states.  Signs may be labelled in states, events, tasks or perhaps other
names related to the physical states by convention, just as traffic lights are,
for example.  Finally, for knowledge-based performance observed informa-
tion from a data display acts as symbols, i.e., representations which can be
treated directly by symbolic data processing for problem solving.  It is clear
from this that the role of presented data varies fundamentally with the task
situation and optimal coding presupposes knowledge of the proper domain
of performance.  Seen the other way, the presentation of properly designed
data formats can be used to activate the proper level of cognitive control of
behaviour. it seems evident that the same presentation will not be optimal
for all three levels and also, with undifferentiated presentation, that indica-
tors which acquire clear significance as signs in familiar situations will have
strong bias against playing the role of symbols in rare situations.  The data
transformations needed to make the same measured information available to
operators as signals, signs or symbols is a task which is directly fit for com-
puters.
OPERATOR TRAINING
Another aspect in which the domains differ fundamentally is the mode in
which the human learns about system properties.  In the skill-based do-
main, learning is based on behavioural patterns of movements stored during
performance of the task under the control of either higher level cognitive
functions, or of an external teacher with his "hand on the bicycle saddle".
The process computer has led to the development of "high fidelity" dynamic
training simulators which generally are considered important for training of
aircraft and space-vehicle control during emergency situations, since the
task is a time-space multivariable control task. (The empirical evidence is
discussed in a recent review by Stammers (1979)).  However, it does not ap-
pear to be evident that high fidelity dynamic simulators are necessary for
training of skill-based behaviour in most process industries.  Transfer of
"process-feel" seems to be rather effective within time constants and gain
characteristics of the same ranges and simple dynamic simulators could
serve that purpose.  Training within the rule-based domain typically de-
pends on rehersal of the cues and rules of the game.  It is important to know
the locations of sources of cues and of knobs and switches, but static mock-
ups or magnetic board displays have proved efficient (Duncan 1975) for
training by exercises or "talk-throughs" (Swain, private communication).
Unfortunately, people are mouldable and learning not only during the formal
training periods.  The plant itself continues their training very effectively
and, ultimately, the rule-based behaviour will depend upon interface char-
acteristics rather than formal training.  It is therefore important to support
rarely used rules and to arrange the interface in a way so that operational
optimization of frequently used rules does not violate risky, but latent con-
ditions.
Operators have no chance for developing empirical rules for infrequent oc-
currences, and work instructions cannot be preplanned for all possible
situations.  Furthermore, one of the recent "lessons learned" from TMI has
been that it cannot be assumed that an instructional system for major acci-
dents will take care of the less critical situations and thus help operators to
cope with these.  Consequently, in modern large scale industrial installa-
tions, reliable operation to an increasing degree depends upon the operator
being able to perform in the knowledge-based domain, i.e., to form the nec-
essary rules ad-hoc in the actual situation.  Very little is apparently known
about the content and means of training operators for knowledge-based
performance; the dynamic and visual verisimilitude of expensive simulators
is not related to the necessary knowledge of operators for performance in
this domain, and training in the theoretical, physical description of plant
function alone is not adequate.  Actually, much of the knowledge of internal
functions and causes needed can be presented by computer controlled dis-
plays in a proper symbolic domain; the difficult information to bring to the
operator will be the intentions and reasons which were the designer's basis
for the functions chosen and for the operational specifications.  Not only is
this information difficult to present to the operators, but, generally, the de-
signer's intentions and reasons are not explicitly available to the operating
staff, since they simply fade away as soon as the designer has put the sche-
matics on paper.  An obvious use of a computer would be as a design aid
which could store the information base generated during design and subse-
quently present it to the operating staff in a suitable form.
THE FEEDBACK DESIGN CONCEPT
To rely on the operator's performance in the knowledge-based domain
where the goals and ends are specified, the means are supplied but the op-
erator is left to plan the procedural rules, is, in a way, in accordance with
the general system design principle of coping with high intrinsic variability
in component performance by the use of feedback correction.  One can won-
der why the emergence Of large scale, high risk installations has led to an
extensive use of detailed formal procedural instruction to control the plants
in case of maloperation.  This is, in fact, equivalent to choosing a prepro-
grammed, feedforward function to perform a complex control task; an ap-
proach which outside the human function area would not be considered
good engineering practise.  It is, of course, also possible for the operator in
the rule-based domain to detect unsatisfactory outcome of the application of
procedural rules and to try to correct this by modifying the rules; but this
means that he switches to knowledge-based performance and very likely will
end up in the well-known conflict situation - when to "follow the book", and
when to "think for yourself".  In case of unsuccessful actions, it depends
upon the conception by the judging body of the norm as reflected either by
the procedure itself or by the goal - as to whether the operator or the proce-
dure/system designer will be made responsible for the error.  Moreover, the
norm may very likely by perceived differently during the situation and after
the fact.
HUMAN ERROR
The definition of human error is related to the deviation from a norm, i.e.,
some specified or normal performance which itself will be different for the
different domains of control of human behaviour.  In the skill-based domain,
behaviour is controlled by the adaptive patterns stored in the nerve system.
Due to the high physiological redundancy of this system, the concept of
"human error" becomes meaningless, and inappropriate behaviour can only
be explained by changes in the external world leading to a "misfit" with the
trained neural patterns in the responding person, or to a variability in the
control and coordination of movements exceeding the tolerance of the sys-
tem.  In these cases, the causes cannot reasonably be referred to as "opera-
tor error"; they are rather instances of man-machine misfits.  In the rule-
based domain, the reference norm will generally be the rule, i.e., the right
way of doing things, either in the form of general professional know-how or
formal work instructions.  Errors will often be detected by their effects in
terms of terminal state/goal discrepancies but judged against the normative
rule.  In the knowledge-based domain, however, an error can only be identi-
fied from the unsuccessful attainment of the goal, and it can be difficult to
judge whether operator error is a proper classification.  Since an error can
be the outcome of a resource/demand conflict, it is necessary to ensure that
the operator had adequate resources during the situation, before we refer
the fault to the operator.  In conclusion then, two basic design problems are
found.  One is to create work situations for the operator which lead to a
clear discrimination between occurrences where goals are normative and op-
erators are not only allowed to, but also expected to, generate and optimize
their own plans, and occurrences where normative rules are effective and
mandatory on account of latent, risky conditions.  The other problem is that
of keeping the operators' knowledge base satisfactorily updated for infre-
quent needs.  This may presuppose changes in present organizational and
educational structures.  A few weeks refresher course on a training simula-
tor each year is no solution.  A solution will imply that tasks demanding
knowledge-based performance are integrated in the normal functions allo-
cated the operators.  This in turn can mean that operators will perform
tasks which are now allocated professional engineers or maintenance spe-
cialists, or that such specialists are integrated in the operating staff by ei-
ther being on hand or on call.
Event reports including cases of "human errors" are very important
sources of information on human performance and are waiting for serious
consideration by researchers and system designers.  Information on internal
functions and their limitations can only be obtained for adaptive systems
from instances when the adaptation proves inefficient.  "To the extent that
he (man) is effectively adaptive, his behaviour will reflect characteristics
largely of the outer environment (in the light of his goals) and will reveal only
a few limiting properties of his inner environment - of the physiological ma-
chinery that enables his to think". (Simon, 1969, p. 25).  It is, therefore, im-
portant to analyse event reports and case stories, not only to obtain statisti-
cal information on human errors in terms of the effects upon task perform-
ance for reliability prediction, but in particular to understand the error
mechanisms and to generalize in order to be able to improve interface de-
sign.
Thus, several aspects of the instances of human malfunction should be
characterized separately.  First of all, the analysis must identify the human
function that failed its purpose - and the way it failed - in terms referring to
the internal human task independent of the external task and system.  For
this purpose, information processing concepts related to detection, identifi-
cation, decision, etc., seem to be well suited and compatible with current
cognitive psychology as well as control theory.  In addition a task analysis is
necessary to relate these internal functions to the external task and to iden-
tify possible external causes to the malfunction.
CONCLUSION
Major industrial incidents and accidents are generally followed by a "les-
sons learned" discussion which very often concludes with demands for
"more of" all the traditional precautions: operators should be trained better;
more instruments should be installed, management should be improved,
etc., and the recommendations are typically tailored to counteract the spe-
cific situation causing the discussion.  The flexibility and capacity of modern
inexpensive computer systems practically speaking invite extensive efforts to
explore their potential in this context.  The present paper is a modest plea
for spending a fair amount of efforts and resources in the search for a fun-
damental framework to guide the design of improved systems.  The work
presented is part of a Scandinavian research project sponsored by the Board
of Nordic Ministers, for the study of control room design and human reli-
ability in nuclear power plants.
REFERENCES
(1) Duncan,' K.D., A simulator and training technique for diagnosing plant failures from
control panels, Ergonomics, 1975, vol. 18, no. 6, 627-641.
(2) Goodstein, L.P. and Rasmussen, J., Man-machine system design criteria in computer-
ized control rooms, "ASSOPO 8011, IFIP/IFAC conference, Trondheim, Norway, June
1980.
(3) Purdue, 1975, Guidelines for the design of man-machine interfaces for process control,
Purdue Laboratory for Applied Industrial Control, Purdue University.
(4) Rasmussen, J., What can be learned from human error reports?, in "Changes in working
life", K.D. Duncan, M.M. Gruneberg & D. Wallis (Eds.), John Wiley & Sons, 1980.
(5) Simon, H.A., The sciences of the artificial M.I.T. Press, 1969.
(6) Stammers, R.B., Simulation in training for nuclear power plant operators, report n. 12,
Ergonomr'ad, Karlstad, Sweden, 1979.

